All for COPYRIGHT Stand Up and Holler! Three Cheers for Star Athletica and the U.S. Supreme Court’s Perceived and Imagined Separately Test by Shipley, David E
Digital Commons @ Georgia Law
Scholarly Works Faculty Scholarship
1-1-2018
All for COPYRIGHT Stand Up and Holler! Three
Cheers for Star Athletica and the U.S. Supreme
Court’s Perceived and Imagined Separately Test
David Shipley
Georgia Athletic Association Professor in Law
University of Georgia School of Law, shipley@uga.edu
University of Georgia School of Law
Research Paper Series
Paper No. 2017-25
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Digital Commons @ Georgia Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Scholarly Works by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Georgia Law. Please share how you have benefited from this access
For more information, please contact tstriepe@uga.edu.
Repository Citation
David E. Shipley, All for COPYRIGHT Stand Up and Holler! Three Cheers for Star Athletica and the U.S. Supreme Court’s Perceived and
Imagined Separately Test , 36 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 149 (2018),
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/fac_artchop/1173
ALL FOR COPYRIGHT STAND UP AND HOLLER!
THREE CHEERS FOR STAR A THLETICA AND THE
U.S. SUPREME COURT'S PERCEIVED AND
IMAGINED SEPARATELY TEST*
PROFESSOR DAVID E. SHIPLEY
I. PRODUCT SHAPE, THE COPYRIGHT PREFERENCE, AND THE
COMPETITIVE MANDATE ............................. 152
II. COPYRIGHT PROTECTION OF APPLIED ART FROM MAZER TO STAR
ATHLETICA .................................. ...... 154
III. STAR ATHLETICA V. VARSITY BRANDS ....................... 159
IV. THE IMPACT OF STAR ATHLETICA ................... ....... 165
A. What if? The New Test as Applied to Clothing,
Mannequins, Outdoor Light Fixture and Bike Racks..... 165
1. Clothing and the Fashion Industry: ...... ....... 165
2. Mannequins and Conceptually Separable Artistic
Features: ............... .................. 168
3. Outdoor Lights and Bike Racks - Still Unprotectable! 171
B. There will be an increase in the number ofproduct shape
copyright infringement claims after Star Athletica........ 174
C. The risk that copyright protection will be extended to
utilitarian features ...................... ..... 176
CONCLUSION..................................................179
In March 2017 the United States Supreme Court held in Star
Athletica L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands Inc. that an artistic feature
incorporated into the design of a useful article could be protected by
copyright when that feature could be perceived as a two- or three-
dimensional work of art separate from the useful article, and imagined
separately as a protectable pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work.1 This
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two-part test replaces a variety of tests which courts and commentators
proposed and applied during the last 40 years. 2 The Star Athletica
decision is predicted to be a boon to the fashion and apparel industry,
furniture designers, and manufacturers of other useful consumer
products.3 Depending on how leniently or generously the new test is
applied, it could result in an increase in the number of useful articles
with artistic features which can be conceptually separated from the
article's utilitarian features and protected by copyright.4
This article discusses the potential impact of the Star Athletica
decision and the Court's new two-part test for separability. The first
section summarizes how product shape and design are protected under
our intellectual property laws, explains the preference for copyright, and
sets forth federal policy allowing the public to copy products that our
patent and copyright laws leave in the public domain.5 It next provides
an overview of how copyright protection for the artistic features
incorporated in useful articles evolved between the Supreme Court's
1954 decision in Mazer v. Stein6 and its decision in Star Athletica7 in
2 Vicki Y. Nee, Susan Natland & Boris Zelkind, The Top Hits: Fashion Cases with a Big Impact,
KNOBBE MARTENS (June 6, 2017) (noting that court decisions should lead to uniformity in this
area of the law); Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC, 799 F.3d 468, 484-85 (6th Cir.
2015) (summarizing nine approaches to separability).
3 See, e.g., Kevin Thompson, A Multi-Layered Approach to Packaging Protection, LADAS &
PARRY (May 15, 2017), https:/iladas.com/education-center/6129-2/; Ronald Mann, Opinion
analysis: Court uses cheerleader uniform case to validate broad copyright in industrial designs,
SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 22, 2017), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/03/opinion-analysis-court-uses-
cheerleader-uniform-case-validate-broad-copyright-industrial-designs/; Cheerleaders Cheer On
Copyright Protection, PENNINGTONS MANCHES LLP (May 10,2017),
http://www.penningtons.co.uk/news-publications/latest-news/2017/cheerleaders-cheer-on-
copyright-protection/; Copyright is "In Fashion" Following Supreme Court's Decision
Upholding Protection for Cheerleading Uniform Design, FOSTER SwIFT COLLINS & SMITH PC
(June 1, 2017), http://www.michiganitlaw.com/copyright-fashion-protecting-design; Vishwannath
Mohan, Star Athletica v. Varsity Brands: SCOTUS Cheers for Broader Copyright Protection, 59
Orange County Law 36, 39-40 (2017); but see, Sherry Jeter, Mayer Brown LLP, Supreme Court
of the United States: Cheerleading Uniforms Can be Copyrightable: Star Athletica LLC v. Varsity
Brands, Inc., AIPLA Newsstand, June 1, 2017 (opining that the ruling has not significantly
changed the copyright landscape in the apparel industry).
4 See, e.g., Gene Quinn & Steve Brachman, Copyrights at the Supreme Court: Star Athletica v.
Varsity Brands, IPWATCHDOG (Mar. 22, 2017),
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/03/22/copyrights-supreme-court-star-athletica-v-varsity-
brands/id=79767/; Meaghan H. Kent & Taylor G. Sachs, Copyright Office Accounts for Supreme
Court's Star Athletica Decision, VENABLE LLP (July 5, 2017),
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g-33ad26c2-70 ld-42c4-8006-dd988212d4e2
(discussing proposed changes in the Copyright Office's Compendium that "indicate consideration
of the nuanced change, and potential expansion of copyrightability for design elements of useful
articles"); Patrick K. McClay, Has Copyright Protection Expanded for Useful Articles?, BAKER
BOTrS LLP (Nov. 2017), http://www.bakerbotts.com/ideas/publications/2017/11/ip-report-p-
mcclay (discussing the impact of Star Athletica on a case involving a decorative ornamental light
set).
5 Ralph Brown, Design Protection: An Overview, 34 UCLA. L. Rev. 1341 (1987).
6 Mazer et al. v. Stein et al., 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct 1002 (2017).
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2017. After summarizing the majority, concurring, and dissenting
opinions in Star Athletica, the article applies the new test in several
difficult pre-Star Athletica cases in order assess the decision's practical
impact on a variety of useful articles.
This survey of the new test's application to pre-Star Athletica
cases leads to the following conclusions and contentions. Although the
Supreme Court's new test brings uniformity and often should be
relatively easy to apply in connection with pictorial and graphic works
applied on useful articles, the application of the new test to sculptural
features incorporated into useful articles will remain challenging for
counsel and courts. Infringement claims over useful articles that are
similar to those at issue in the tough cases from the pre-Star Athletica
era will remain difficult. Even though the overall shape of a useful
article like a chair, toaster, food processor, car or bike rack can be
expressed by an industrial designer in different ways, there should be no
copyright protection for any of these articles unless they have a
separable feature.8 The nation's legislative policy against protection for
industrial design should bar copyright when an article's aesthetic
elements are inextricably interwoven with its utilitarian aspects. 9 The
risk of applying the Supreme Court's new test too leniently or
generously is the grant of copyright protection to an article's overall
shape, and this extends the copyright monopoly to a useful article's
functional or utilitarian features.
This article uses the terms 'leniently' and 'generously'
interchangeably to describe a pro-copyright claimant approach to
applying the new test and finding artistic features conceptually
separable from a useful article's functional and utilitarian features;
giving the designer the benefit of the doubt that features are separable
and not inextricably interwoven with the article's overall shape.
Extending copyright protection in this way could result in outcomes
which would be contrary to Congress's steadfast refusal since 1914 to
enact a general industrial design protection statute' 0 as well the Supreme
Court's statements about the importance of the competitive mandate and
the public's right to copy that which our copyright and patent laws leave
in the public domain."
8 Cf Jane Ginsburg, "Courts Have Twisted Themselves into Knots": U.S. Copyright Protection
for AppliedArt, 40 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 1, 2-3, 54 (2016).
9 Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 591 F.2d 796, 807 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (Leventhal, concurring).
10 CRAIG JOYCE, TYLER OCHOA, MICHAEL CARROLL, MARSHALL LEAFFER & PETER JASZI,
COPYRIGHT LAW 198-99 (10th ed. 2016) (hereinafter Craig Joyce et al.); MARSHALL LEAFFER,
UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW 130 (6th ed. 2014) (noting that design protection legislation
has been introduced regularly). Congress passed specialized design protection statutes for vessel
hulls in 1998, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1301-32, and the shape of semi-conductor chips in 1984, 17 U.S.C.
§§ 901-14; Esquire, Inc., 591 F.2d at 800 n.12 (noting that approximately 70 design protection
bills had been introduced in Congress since 1914).
11 Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989); Compco Corp. v.
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I. PRODUCT SHAPE, THE COPYRIGHT PREFERENCE, AND THE COMPETITIVE
MANDATE
In order to appreciate the potential impact of Star Athletica it is
important to recognize that manufacturers want to protect the shapes
and designs of their products, and prevent competitors from making and
selling knock-offs.1 2 As a consequence, there have been hotly contested
lawsuits over protection for the designs and shapes of a wide range of
products from cheerleading outfits and belt-buckles 3 to bike racks and
light fixtures,1 4 faucets, road signs and hubcaps,' 5 lamps and tables,16
and mannequins of heads, human torsos and animals.' 7 The bases for
protecting product shape and design are found in several areas of
intellectual property law including design patent,' 8 trademark and trade
dress law,1 9 and copyright.20 However, Congress has declined
repeatedly to enact general protection for industrial design as found in
other countries, 21 and state law protection for product shape and design
raises serious questions of federal preemption.22
Due in part to the U.S. Supreme Court's 1954 decision in Mazer v.
Stein, upholding copyright protection for statuettes of Balinese dancers
Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237 (1964).
12 LEAFFER, supra note 10, at 121; Brown, supra note 5, at 1341-42.
13 Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct 1002 (2017); Kieselstein-Cord v.
Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1980).
14 Brandir International, Inc. v. Cascade Pacific Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142 (2d Cir. 1987);
Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 591 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
15 Kohler Co. v. Moen, Inc., 12 F.3d 632 (7th Cir. 1993); Norris Indus., Inc. v. Int'l Tel. & Tel.
Corp, 696 F.2d 918 (11th Cir. 1983); Traffix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays Inc., 532 U.S. 23
(2001).
16 Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225
(1964); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964); Magnussen Furniture,
Inc. v. Collezione Europa USA, Inc., 116 F.3d 472 (4th Cir. 1997).
17 Pivot Point International, Inc. v. Charlene Products, Inc., 372 F.3d 913 (7th Cir. 2004); Carol
Barnhart, Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1985); Hart v. Dan Chase
Taxidermy Supply Co., 86 F.3d 320 (2d Cir. 1996).
18 35 U.S.C. § 171 (2015) (noting that a design patent may be obtained for "any new, original,
and ornamental design for an article of manufacture"); Egyptian Goddess Inc. v. Swisa Inc., 543
F.3d 665 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
19 See, e.g., Kohler Co., 12 F.3d at 632; Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S.
205 (2000); Traffix Devices, Inc., 532 U.S. at 23.
20 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102(a)(5) (defining pictorial, graphic and sculptural works); see Joshua
Rudawitz & Patrick Concannon, Fashion and Intellectual Property: Many Options to Protect
Your Design, But No One-Stop Shop, LEXOLOGY (May 30, 2017),
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g-f6ba8878-4226-45ea-be4a-097afaecde69
(discussing copyright, trademark and design patent as options for protecting aspects of clothing).
21 JOYCE ET AL., supra note 10, at 198-99; LEAFFER, supra note 10, at 130 (noting also that
design protection legislation has been introduced regularly); Esquire, Inc., 591 F.2d at 800 n.12
(noting that approximately 70 design bills had been introduced in Congress between 1914 and
1978).
22 See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co., 376 U.S. at 229; Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats,
Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 167; see also LEAFFER, supra note 10, at 131-32; David Shipley, Refusing to
Rock the Boat: The Sears/Compco Preemption Doctrine Applied to Bonito Boats v. Thunder
Craft, 25 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 385 (1990).
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used as lamp bases, 2 3 copyright has come to be regarded as preferable to
design patent, trademark law and trade dress for protecting artistic
features embodied in useful articles. The reasons for this preference also
include the rigorous requirements for obtaining a design patent,24 and
the role of functionality as a limit on trademark and trade dress
protection for product shape.25 The Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity
Brands, Inc. decision will likely strengthen this preference for the
copyright option by announcing a simple two-step test for determining
separability and copyrightability 26 that should result in uniformity, and
also clarify what designers can protect. 2 7
However, the Court started its Star Athletica opinion by stating
that "Congress has provided copyright protection for original works of
art, but not for industrial designs. The line between art and industrial
design, however, is often difficult to draw. This is particularly true
when an industrial design incorporates artistic elements." 28 Lurking
behind this statement are the often confusing intersections of our
copyright and patent laws with trademark, trade dress, anti-dilution law,
and unfair competition doctrine in regard to how creators are afforded
protection against copying and imitation. Also relevant is a series of
U.S. Supreme Court decisions that "emphatically reject the use of [our
trademark laws] to extend property-like protection beyond that afforded
by copyright and patent law, confirm the primacy of the substantive
restrictions on federal protection expressed in the Intellectual Property
Clause, and bolster our nation's historical competitive mandate by
promoting competition." 29 These decisions, including the Sears and
Compco decisions from 1964 and Bonito Boats from 1989, have the
effect of protecting the public domain from encroachment by making it
difficult for businesses and others to claim ownership of words, colors,
product shapes and designs, and other works of authorship in the public
23 Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954); LEAFFER, supra note 10, at 121 (noting that the role of
copyright in protecting artistic creations embodying utilitarian objects has generated controversy).
24 LEAFFER, supra note 10, at 128-289 (discussing the time and expense of securing design
patent protection and the fact that many patents are declared invalid).
25 JOYCE ET AL., supra note 10, at 198; LEAFFER, supra note 10, at 131; Traffix Devices, Inc. v.
Mktg. Displays Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001) (noting that the existence of an expired utility patent is
strong evidence that the feature protection by the patent is functional and cannot be protected as
trade dress); Blumenthal Distrib., Inc. v. Herman Miller, Inc., No. ED CV14-01926 JAK (SPx),
2017 BL 267966, *10 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 1 2017) (noting that the jury had enough evidence to rule
that Herman Miller's Aeron chair's features were functional and unprotectable, but that Miller's
Eames chair was protectable); But see Ginsburg, supra note 8, at 1-2 (noting that "Congress
intended to impose a high threshold to the copyrightability of useful articles").
26 Rudawitz & Concannon, supra note 20, at 1 (stating that the Court's simple test has clarified
and expanded how copyright can protect designs quickly and inexpensively).
27 Knobbe Martens, supra note 2, at 2.
28 Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S.Ct. 1002, 1007 (2017) (emphasis added).
29 David Shipley, What Do Flexible Road Signs, Children's Clothes and the Allied Campaign in
Europe During WWI Have in Common? The Public Domain and the Supreme Court's
Intellectual Property Jurisprudence, 13 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 57, 58 (2005).
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domain.30
Star Athletica must not be read in isolation from these decisions
and the principles for which they stand. The Court has stated that "the
[Intellectual Property] Clause contains both a grant of power and certain
limitations on the exercise of that power," and that it "reflects a balance
between the need to encourage innovation and the avoidance of
monopolies which stifle competition without any concomitant advance
of 'Progress of Science and useful Arts."' 31 Copying an unpatented
improvement or using a public domain work of authorship is a privilege
of our system of competitive enterprise, and any unprotected article,
structure, product, story, work of art or design can be imitated or
appropriated.32 In summary, in applying the two-step test from Star
Athletica and trying to draw the line between a useful article's
protectable artistic features and that article's unprotectable industrial
design features which are functional or utilitarian, courts and counsel
must not ignore fundamental policy embodied in the Intellectual
Property Clause; the public has the right to copy whatever the patent
and copyright laws leave in the public domain. 33 This policy is at risk if
the Star Athletica two-part separability test is applied too leniently. 34
II. COPYRIGHT PROTECTION OF APPLIED ART FROM MA4ZER TO STAR
A THLETICA
In 1954 the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the use of copyright to
protect artistic works embodied in useful articles in Mazer v. Stein.35
The works at issue were statuettes of Balinese dancers used as lamp
bases. The defendants had manufactured knock-offs, and argued that it
was inappropriate to copyright a work of art intended to be mass
produced as part of a useful article like a lamp base.36 In ruling for the
copyright claimant the Court endorsed the practice of the Copyright
Office to allow the registration of articles like the statuettes 'as works of
the fine arts' pursuant to a regulation which stated, "[t]his class includes
30 Id
31 Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146.
32 Cf J.C. Penney Co. v. H.D. Lee Mercantile Co., 120 F.2d 949, 953 (8th Cir. 1941); see also
Kellogg Co. v. Nat'l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 122 (1938).
33 Cf Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237; Shipley, supra note 29, at
61.
34 See infra text accompanying notes 191-215.
35 Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
36 Id. at 203-04 (noting that the defendant/petitioners asserted that the question was "can
statuettes be protected in the United States by copyright when the copyright applicant intended
primarily to use the statuettes in the form of lamp bases to be made and sold in quantity and
carried the intentions into effect? Stripped down to its essentials, the question presented is: can a
lamp manufacturer copyright his lamp bases?"); id. at 204-05 (noting that the Court rephrased
this saying, saying that the case requires an answer as to "an artist's right to copyright a work of
art intended to be reproduced for lamp bases.").
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works of artistic craftsmanship, in so far as their form but not their
mechanical or utilitarian aspects are concerned, such as artistic
jewelry, enamels, glassware, and tapestries, as well as works belonging
to the fine arts, such as paintings, drawing and sculptures .. .. 37
Neither the intended use of the statuettes as lamp stands nor the
possibility of a design patent prevented copyright protection. 38
However, the plaintiffs copyright did not extend to the idea of using a
statuette as a lamp base nor to the way the lamps worked; their
mechanical or utilitarian aspects. Affording copyright protection to the
idea of using a statuette as a lamp base, or to the lamps' unpatented
utilitarian and functional features, would be anti-competitive. 39 In other
words, the defendants could sculpt dancers to serve as lamp stands and
configure the wiring and the shade like the plaintiffs lamps, but their
dancers could not be substantially similar to the plaintiff's copyrightable
dancers.
These fundamental principles were reflected in a regulation the
Copyright Office promulgated several years after Mazer v. Stein40 as
well as in the comprehensive revision of the Copyright Act that
Congress enacted in 1976. Section 102(a)(5) of the Act provides for the
copyrightability of "pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works" which are
defined as "two-dimensional and three-dimensional works of fine,
graphic, and applied art, photographs, prints, and art reproductions,
maps, globes, charts, diagrams, models, and technical drawings." 41
Another provision of the Act, section 113(a), provides that "the
exclusive right to reproduce a copyrighted pictorial, graphic, or
sculptural work in copies under section 106 includes the right to
reproduce the work in or on any kind of article, whether useful or
otherwise." 42 Accordingly, it is clear and consistent with Mazer that an
artist's right to reproduce his or her pictorial, graphic, or sculptural
work in copies includes reproducing it in or on a useful article. The
Act's definition codifies another aspect of Mazer by stating that:
the design of a useful article . . . shall be considered a
pictorial, graphic or sculptural work only if, and only
to the extent that, such design incorporates pictorial,
37 Id. at 212-13 (citing and quoting from 37 C.F.R., § 202.10 (1949)) (emphasis added).
38 Id. at 218-19.
39 LEAFFER, supra note 10, at 121-22.
40 "If the sole intrinsic function of an article is its utility, the fact that the article is unique and
attractively shaped will not qualify it as work of art. However, if the shape of a utilitarian article
incorporates features, such as artistic sculpture, carving or pictorial representation, which can be
identified separately and are capable of existing independently as a work of art, such features will
be eligible for registration." 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(c) (1959).
41 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
42 17 U.S.C. § 113(a) (2012).
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graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified
separately from, and are capable of existing
independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the
article.43
In essence, useful articles as such are not protectable by copyright,
but separable artistic features incorporated in or on useful articles might
be copyrightable. The House Report accompanying the 1976 Act states
that this statutory language was added in "an effort to make clearer the
distinction between works of applied art protectable under the bill and
industrial designs not subject to copyright protection."44 The report
elaborated on this point by stating:
A two-dimensional painting, drawing, or graphic work is still
capable of being identified as such when it is printed on or applied to
utilitarian articles such as textile fabrics, wallpaper, containers, and
the like. The same is true when a statue or carving is used to
embellish an industrial product or, as in [Mazer v. Stein], is
incorporated into a product without losing its ability to exist
independently as a work of art. On the other hand, although the shape
of an industrial product may be aesthetically satisfying and valuable,
the Committee's intention is not to offer it copyright protection under
the bill. Unless the shape of an automobile, airplane, ladies' dress,
food processor, television set, or any other industrial product
contains some element that, physically or conceptually, can be
identified as separable from the utilitarian aspects of that article, the
design would not be copyrighted under the bill.45
Notwithstanding the clarity of the Act and this legislative history,
showing Congress's desire to exclude industrial products from
copyright protection even if they have aesthetically pleasing designs, 46
courts have had considerable difficulty drawing the line between the
protectable artistic and unprotectable utilitarian features of useful
articles. It is often hard to determine whether artistic features embodied
in applied art and other utilitarian objects "can be identified separately
from, and are capable of existing independently of the utilitarian aspects
43 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (stating that a "useful article" is defined as "an article having an
intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey
information. An article that is normally a part of a useful article is considered a 'useful article.").
44 H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 54 (1976); see also Ginsburg, supra note 8, at 8-11 (discussing the
Copyright Office's disfavor of copyright protection for industrial design generally during the
period that the 1976 Act was being drafted.).
45 H.R. REP. No. 94-1476 at 55 (emphasis added). There was a serious attempt to enact general
industrial design protection as a sui gener.s piece of legislation appended to the 1976 Act but the
provisions were deleted from the statute that Congress enacted. JOYCE ET AL., supra note 10, at
199.
46 Ginsburg, supra note 8, at 10, 57.
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of the article." 47
A dizzying variety of tests and approaches to help courts draw this
line have been announced starting with the D.C. Circuit in Esquire v.
Ringer in 1978 which affirmed the Copyright Office's denial of
protection for a modem outdoor lighting fixture as a work of art.48
Although the case arose under the 1909 Act, the court turned to the
legislative history of 1976 Act to say that the House Report made clear
that "the overall design or configuration of a utilitarian object, even if it
is determined by aesthetic as well as functional considerations, is not
eligible for copyright." 49 Since the fixture lacked any features or
embellishments which were separable from its overall configuration,
there was nothing to protect by copyright.50 It was not enough that a
developer or builder might want to select this particular fixture over
others for its parking lot and sidewalks because it was more
aesthetically pleasing than other outdoor lights.5 1
Later developments showed that the physical separability of
artistic features could not be the only test for determining
copyrightability, and it became well accepted by courts and
commentators "that the protection of the copyright statute also can be
secured when a conceptual separability exists between the material
sought to be copyrighted and the utilitarian design in which that
material is incorporated." 52 According to the Copyright Office,
conceptual separability "means that a feature of the useful article is
clearly recognizable as a pictorial graphic, or sculptural work,
notwithstanding the fact that it cannot be physically separated from the
article by ordinary means."53 The agency's examples of this include
engraving on a vase, carving on the back of a chair and art printed on a
t-shirt or wallpaper. 54 Notwithstanding this guidance, there was no
agreement on how to determine whether artistic features were
conceptually separable.55
One court suggested that copyright protection was appropriate
when the artistic features were primary and the utilitarian features were
47 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
48 Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 591 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
49 Id. at 804.
50 LEAFFER, supra note 10, at 124.
51 See H. R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 55 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5668, supra
notes 44-45.
52 Pivot Point International, Inc. v. Charlene Products, Inc., 372 F.3d 913, 922; Varsity Brands,
Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC., 799 F.3d 468, 483.
53 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES § 924.2[B]
(3d ed. 2014).
54 Id
55 See, e.g., Pivot Point International, Inc., 372 F.3d at 922-30 (summarizing and discussing
several different tests and how those tests were applied in particular cases); Varsity Brands, Inc.,
799 F.3d at 484-85 (discussing nine different tests).
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subsidiary. 56 Another said that copyright should be available when the
article "stimulates in the mind of the beholder a concept that is separate
from the concept evoked by its utilitarian function."57 An influential
treatise said that conceptual separability exists when the useful article
"would still be marketable to some significant segment of the
community simply because of its aesthetic qualities," 58 while another
commentator said that there is separability when artistic features "can
stand alone as a work of art traditionally conceived, and .. . the useful
article in which it is embodied would be equally useful without it."59 A
fifth test was that separability exists when the artistic design was not
significantly influenced by functional considerations, 60 and a sixth test,
proposed by another commentator, was that artistic features are
separable when they are not utilitarian.61 This is not an exhaustive list as
evidenced by the Sixth Circuit's summary of nine approaches to
conceptual separability in its Star Athletica opinion.62
The courts, in applying the various tests, upheld copyright
protection for decorative belt buckles, 63 a life size mannequin head used
by hair stylists, 64 animal mannequins used by taxidermists, 65 nose masks
representing the snouts and beaks of pigs, parrots and other animals, 66
Halloween costumes, 67 laminated flooring with the digitally
56 Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989, 993 (2d Cir. 1980) (discussing
copyright protection for belt buckles).
57 Carol Barnhart, Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 422 (2d Cir. 1985) (Newman, J.
dissenting) (noting that the majority denied copyright protection for mannequins used for
displaying clothing in department stores).
5 Melville Nimrner & David Nimmer, 1 Nimmer on Copyright § 2.08[B][4], at 2A-101.
59 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT § 2.5.3, at 2:67.
60 Brandir International, Inc. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F. 2d 1142, (2d Cir. 1987) (denying
copyright protection to a bike rack). This is the test proposed by Professor Denicola in Applied
Art & Industrial Design: A Suggested Approach to Copyright in Useful Articles, 67 MINN. L.
REV. 707 (1983).
61 WILLIAM F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW & PRACTICE 285 (1994).
62 Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC., 799 F.3d 468, 484-85; Karen Lim, Supreme
Court: New Copyright Eligibility Test For Clothing Designs and Other Useful Articles, FROSS
ZELNICK LEHRMAN & ZISSU P.C. (June 5, 2017),
http://www.frosszelnick.com/newsletterarticle/supreme-court-new-copyright-eligibility-test-
clothing-designs-and-other-useful ("By some counts, more than a dozen different and competing
legal tests have been developed for determining whether the 'separability' requirement of section
101 is satisfied.").
63 Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989, 993-94.
64 Pivot Point International, Inc. v. Charlene Products, 372 F.3d 913, 932.
65 Superior Form Builders v. Dan Chase Taxidermy Supply Co., 74 F.3d 488 (4th Cir. 1996)
(noting that an animal mannequin form is not a useful article because it portrays the appearance
of an animal); Hart v. Dan Chase Taxidermy Supply, 86 F.3d 320 (2d Cir. 1996) (noting that a
fish form is not a useful article because it portrays its own appearance and comes within the scope
of the Copyright Act).
66 Masquerade Novelty, Inc. v. Unique Industries, Inc., 912 F.2d 663 (3d Cir. 1990) (noting that
nose masks are not useful articles, and are copyrightable as sculptural works).
67 Chosun Int'l Inc. v. Chrisha Creations, Ltd, 413 F.3d 324 (2d Cir. 2005) (reversing lower court
ruling that costumes could not be protected and remanding for a determination of separability).
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manipulated appearance of aged wood planks,68 and decorative
elements of furniture designs. 69 At the same time, courts denied
copyright protection for mannequin torsos used to display clothing, 70 a
bike rack,71 costumes, 72 the selection and arrangement of sequins and
beads on a prom dress, 73 decorative elements of uniforms, 74 artistic
aspects of measuring spoons, 75 the shape of a hookah water container,76
and the design features of cast-iron tables.77
The several tests as well as the varied results caused one judge to
write that courts "have twisted themselves in knots trying to create a test
to effectively ascertain whether the artistic aspects of a useful article can
be identified separately from and exist independently of the article's
utilitarian function." 78 Another court stated that "the [conceptual
separability] analysis often sounds more like metaphysics than law." 79
Given the several tests and the varied results, the United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari in Star Athletica to resolve "widespread
disagreement over the proper test for implementing § 101's separate-
identification and independent existence requirements."8 0
III. STAR ATHLETICA V. VARSITY BRANDS
Varsity Brands designs, makes and sells cheerleading uniforms.
They registered over 200 copyrights for two-dimensional designs
consisting of chevrons, lines, curves, diagonals, coloring, stripes, and
shapes that appeared on their uniforms and other garments. They sued
Star Athletica, a competitor, for allegedly infringing the copyrights on
five of the designs. The District Court granted summary judgment for
Star Athletica, holding that the designs were not copyrightable because
they served the utilitarian function of identifying the garments as
cheerleading uniforms and they could not be physically or conceptually
separated from the utilitarian function of the uniforms.81 The Sixth
68 Home Legend, LLC v. Mannington, Mills, Inc., 784 F.3d 1404 (11th Cir. 2015).
69 Universal Furniture Int'l, Inc. v. Collezione Europa USA, Inc., 618 F.3d 417 (4th Cir. 2010).
70 Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1985).
71 Brandir International Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1148-49.
72 Whimsicality, Inc. v. Rubie's Costume Co., 891 F.2d 452,454 (2d Cir. 1989) (noting costumes
are wearing apparel and the Copyright Office rejects applications to register apparel).
73 Jovani Fashion, Inc. v. Fiesta Fashions, 500 Fed. App'x 42 (2d Cir. 2012).
74 Galiano v. Harrah's Operating Co., 416 F.3d 411 (5th Cir. 2005).
75 Bonazoli v. R.S.V.P., Intl, Inc., 353 F. Supp. 2d 218 (D.R.I. 2015).
76 Inhale, Inc. v. Starbuzz Tobacco, Inc., 755 F.3d 1038 (9th Cir. 2014).
77 Magnussen Furniture, Inc. v. Collezione Europa USA, Inc., 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1218 (4th
Cir. 1997).
78 Masquerade Novelty, Inc., v. Unique, 912 F.2d 663, 670 (3d Cir. 1990).
79 Bonazoli v. R.S. V.P., Int'l, Inc., 353 F. Supp. 2d at 224 (holding that artistic aspects of
measuring spoons were not copyrightable).
80 Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S.Ct. 1002, 1007 (2017).
81 Id. at 1007-08 (discussing Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC., 2014 WL 819422
(W.D. Tenn. 2014)); Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC, WL 819422 at *8-9 (noting that
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Circuit reversed and remanded, saying that the Varsity Brands' graphic
designs were separately identifiable from a blank, utilitarian,
cheerleading uniform. The uniform's function was to cover the body,
permit free movement, and wick moisture, and this function did not
depend on the plaintiffs' designs. 82 They could appear side by side with
a uniform, and could be incorporated on different garments or framed as
art. 83 A dissenting judge wrote that the uniform had the utilitarian
function of identifying the wearer as a cheerleader, and that the designs
were integral and inseparable from that function. 84 The U.S. Supreme
Court affirmed with Justice Thomas writing the majority opinion.85
Justice Ginsburg concurred in the judgment and Justice Breyer, joined
by Justice Kennedy, wrote a dissenting opinion.
After stating why certiorari had been granted and announcing the
new, two factor, perceived and separately imagined test, the Court
summarized the proceedings below and quoted the Copyright Act's
pertinent provisions on pictorial, graphic and sculptural works
incorporated into useful articles. 86 It noted that the Act does not protect
useful articles as such but only those features incorporated in the article
"that can be identified separately from, and are capable of existing
independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article."87 As applied to
the designs at issue here, this meant that the Court's task was to
"determine whether the arrangements of lines, chevrons, and colorful
shapes appearing on the surface of respondents' [Varsity Brands']
cheerleading uniforms are eligible for copyright protection as separable
features of the design of those cheerleading uniforms." 88
The Court said that a separability analysis was essential
notwithstanding Varsity Brands' argument that their designs were two-
dimensional works of graphic art appearing on useful articles and
inherently separable. 89 The majority responded that this argument was
the trial court said that the designs were part and parcel of the uniform itself, and that the uniform
lost its function without the designs. It became a blank canvas. Further noting that the designs on
the uniforms had the utilitarian function of uniforms for cheerleading so as to 'clothe the body in
a way that evokes the concept of cheerleading' and were therefore not copyrightable).
82 Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC., 799 F.3d 468, 490-92.
83 Star Athletica, L.L.C., 137 S.Ct. at 1008 (discussing Varsity Brands, Inc., 799 F.3d at 491-92).
84 Id. (discussing Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC., 799 F.3d at 495-96 (McKeague, J.
dissenting)); see also Selected Annotated Cases, 64 J. Copyright Soc'y 73-74 (2017)
(summarizing the lower court decisions); cf Mann, supra note 3 (questioning whether a plain
white cheerleader uniform is as useful as one with stripes and chevrons).
85 Star Athletica, L.L.C., 137 S.Ct. at 1007-08.
86 Id. at 1008 (citing and quoting section 102(a)(5) and the definitions of useful article and
pictorial, graphic and sculptural works in section 101).
87 Id (quoting from the Act's definition of pictorial, graphic and sculptural works in section 101).
88 Id. at 1008-09.
89 Id. at 1009 (emphasis added). In her concurring opinion, Justice Ginsburg also contended that a
consideration of separability was unwarranted because the plaintiffs' designs were not designs of
useful article but graphic works reproduced on useful articles. Id. at 1018 (Ginsburg J.,
concurring); see also Ginsburg, supra note 8, at 3.
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inconsistent with the text of the Copyright Act which requires a
separability analysis for any artistic features incorporated into the
design of a useful article, and defines the pictorial, graphic and
sculptural works category as including two-dimensional works of art.
Thus, the design of a useful article "can include two-dimensional
'pictorial' and 'graphic' features, and separability analysis applies to
those features just as it does to three-dimensional 'sculptural'
features." 90
The Court next discussed when a feature incorporated into a useful
article "(1) 'can be identified separately from,' and (2) is 'capable of
existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article."' 91
Looking again at the text of the statute the Court said the first
requirement-separate identification of the useful article's pictorial,
graphic or sculptural features-is not onerous because the
decisionmaker "need only be able to look at the useful article and spot
some two- or three-dimensional element that appears to have pictorial,
graphic, or sculptural qualities." 92 The second requirement-that the
feature is capable of existing independently of the article's utilitarian
aspects-is usually more difficult to satisfy because that decisionmaker
"must determine that the separately identified feature has the capacity to
exist apart from the utilitarian aspects of the article." 93 This means the
feature has to be able to exist on its own once it is imagined apart from
the useful article. If the feature cannot exist as a pictorial, graphic or
sculptural work when separated from the useful article, then it is one of
the article's utilitarian features. 94
According to the Court, this interpretation is confirmed by the
statute as a whole. 95 The ultimate separability question "is whether the
feature for which copyright protection is claimed would have been
eligible for copyright protection as a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural
work had it originally been fixed in some tangible medium other than a
90 Star Athletica, L.L.C, 137 S.Ct. at 1009 (rejecting the Government's argument that a
separability analysis was unnecessary because Varsity Brands had copyrighted the deposited
drawings and photos and had simply reproduced those works on the surface of a useful article.
The Court stated that generally it did not entertain arguments that were not raised below and that
were not addressed by any party).
91 Id. at 1010 (stating that this is not a free-ranging search for the best copyright policy. Rather, it
depends solely on the statute).
92 Id
93 Id
94 Id. (adding that in order to qualify as a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work, the separable
feature cannot itself be a useful article or "'[a]n article that is normally part of a useful article'
(which is itself considered a useful article)"); id. (citing and quoting section 101. Similarly, a
copyrightable scale replica of a useful article like a car model does not entitle that replica's
creator any rights in the useful article itself); see also Ronald Mann, supra note 3.
95 Star Athletica, L.L.C., 137 S.Ct. at 1010-11 (citing and discussing section 106(1), 113(a) and
101).
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useful article before being applied to a useful article." 96
The Court added that this interpretation was consistent with the
history of the Copyright Act. It summarized Mazer v. Stein,97 noted the
enactment of regulations by the Copyright Office to implement Mazer,
and explained the impact of Mazer and those regulations on the
Copyright Act's language governing protection for the design of useful
articles. 98 "In sum, a feature of the design of a useful article is eligible
for copyright if, when identified and imagined apart from the useful
article, it would qualify as a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work either
on its own or when fixed in some other tangible medium." 99
The application of this test to the designs on the cheerleading
uniforms was said to be straightforward.100 If the stripes, chevrons and
colors were separated from the uniform and applied to a painter's
canvas, they would qualify as two-dimensional works of art. Moreover,
applying those designs to another medium would not, according to the
Court, replicate the uniform itself.101 The majority was not troubled by
Justice Breyer's contention that the designs were not separable because
placing them on a painter's canvas would create a picture of a
cheerleader uniform; he perceived the stripes, chevrons and colors,
when extracted from the useful article, as still having the outline of a
cheerleader outfit. 102 The Court provided several examples of
copyrightable two-dimensional pictorial and graphic works which track
the shape or contour of the articles on which they are applied to counter
Breyer's contention, and said that "[flailing to protect that art would
create an anomaly: It would extend protection to two-dimensional
designs that cover a part of a useful article but would not protect the
same design if it covered entire article." 03
The majority also said that section 101 does not require the
underlying useful article to remain as such once the design element has
been imaginatively separated from the article; it "does not require the
imagined remainder to be a fully functioning useful article at all, much
less an equally useful one." 104 Therefore, the physical-conceptual
distinction is unnecessary. 05 The focus is on the extracted feature, not
on what remains of the useful article after the extraction.1 06 Finally, the
96 Id. at 1011.
97 Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
98 Star Athletica, L.L.C., 137 S.Ct. at 1012.
99 Id.
100 Id
101 Id
102 Id (citing and quoting from Breyer's dissent).
103 Id.
104 StarAthletica, L.L.C., 137 S.Ct. at 1014.
105 Id.; see also Mohan, supra note 3, at 39 (distinguishing between physical and conceptual
separability was explicitly abandoned by the Court).
106 Star Athletica, L.L.C., 137 S.Ct. at 1014; Lim, supra note 62.
162 [Vol. 36:1
ALL FOR COPYRIGHT
Court emphasized that it had not addressed the originality of Varsity
Brands' designs for purposes of copyright protection, 107 and it reiterated
that even if the designs were copyrightable, Varsity Brands would not
have the right to prohibit a competitor from making uniforms with the
same cut, shape or dimensions as its uniforms because its copyrights
extended only to those separable surface designs.10 8
As noted earlier in this summary, Justice Ginsburg concurred in
the judgement but not in the opinion. She contended that the majority's
consideration of the separability test was unnecessary because Varsity
Brands' designs were simply copyrightable pictorial or graphic works
reproduced on useful articles. 109 The designs were standalone works
that the plaintiff sketched on paper, registered with the Copyright Office
as two dimensional designs, and then reproduced on the uniforms, T-
shirts and jackets. 110 "In short, Varsity's designs are not themselves
useful articles . . . ." but graphic works in which it enjoyed the exclusive
right to reproduce on useful articles.III
Justice Ginsburg's position finds support in the fact that copyright
protection for fabric and textile designs is well established. 112 A
designer's rights are infringed when his or her copyrightable plaid or
paisley pattern is reproduced without permission on fabric that is made
into any number of useful articles including shirts, dresses, sheets,
drapes and wallpaper. A fashion designer who reproduces without
permission a copyrighted painting by the Dutch artist Piet Mondrian on
fabric that is made into a simple but colorful dress infringes Mondrian's
copyright. 13 In considering this kind of unauthorized reproductions of a
textile or fabric design it is not necessary to determine whether the
design is separable from the useful article be it clothing, drapes or
wallpaper in order to find infringement of the two dimensional pictorial
or graphic work. It is no different from reproducing the copyrightable
image of Mickey Mouse on the front of a sweatshirt without Disney's
permission; this is the unauthorized reproduction of a two-dimensional
107 Star Athletica, L.L.C., 137 S.Ct. at 1012 n.1.
10 Id. at 1012.
109 Id at 1018 (Ginsburg J., concurring); see also Ginsburg, supra note 8, at 3.
110 Star Athletica, L.L.C., 137 S.Ct. at 1018.
111 Id at 1019; see also 17 U.S.C. § 113(a).
112 See, e.g., Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1960)
(discussing the infringement of textile design); L.A. Printex Indus., Inc. v. Aeropostale, Inc., 676
F.3d 841 (9th Cir. 2012) (discussing the infringement of textile patterns); Unicolors, Inc. v. Urban
Outfitters, Inc., 2017 CCH Copyright Law Decision ¶ 31,078 (9th Cir. 2017) (discussing how
Urban Outfitters infringed by developing a dress with a fabric design that was overwhelmingly
similar to Unicolors' design); Tufenkian Inport/Export Ventures Inc. v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc.,
338 F.3d 127 (2d Cir. 2003) (discussing infringement of textile designs made into carpets); see
also 17 U.S.C. §§ 102(a)(5) & 101 (defining pictorial, graphic and sculptural works).
113 Cf Heilbrunn Timeline of Art History, Metropolitan Museum of Art, October 2006. (Fashion
designer Yves Saint Laurent had a Mondrian collection in the fall of 1965. The collection
featured blocks of primary color with black bordering, inspired by Mondrian).
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pictorial or graphic work. 114
As noted earlier, Varsity Brands made this argument, asserting that
separability analysis was not implicated when the two-dimensional
work was not itself the design of the useful article.115 The majority
responded by saying this argument was inconsistent with the text of the
definition of pictorial, graphic, sculptural works in section 101 that
requires separability analysis for any pictorial, graphic, or sculptural
features that are incorporated in the design of a useful article.1 16 The
Court could have added that the Copyright Office's own examples of
conceptually separable two-dimensional works include engraving on a
vase, carving on the back of a chair and art printed on a t-shirt or
wallpaper."'7 In a nutshell, the majority held that separability analysis is
necessary for pictorial and graphic works applied on useful articles as
well as for sculptural features incorporated in useful articles.
Justice Breyer's dissent, joined by Justice Kennedy, did not
disagree with the majority's test but contended that Varsity Brands'
design features were not capable of existing independently of the
utilitarian aspects of the cheerleader uniforms." 8 He wrote that "[i]n
many or most cases, to decide whether a design or artistic feature of a
useful article is conceptually separate from the article itself, it is enough
to imagine the feature on its own and ask, 'Have I created a picture of a
(useful part of a) useful article?' If so, the design is not separable from
the useful article. If not, it is."11 9 He then acknowledged that this simple
question will not provide an answer in every case, and recognized that
"virtually any industrial design can be thought of separately as a 'work
of art."1 20 After recognizing that Congress had repeatedly rejected
design protection bills and left protection for dress designs largely
unavailable, 121 he explained that "the esthetic elements on which
Varsity seeks protection exist only as part of the uniform design"1 22 and
emphasized that one could not claim a copyright in a useful article
"merely by creating a replica of that article in another medium." 23 In
114 Star Athletica, L.L.C., 137 S.Ct. at 1018 n.3 (Ginsburg J., concurring); id.at 1030 (Breyer J.,
dissenting); see also Compendium III § 924.2[B] (providing examples of artistic works that
conceptual separable "[a]rt printed on a t-shirt" or "[a] drawing on the surface of wallpaper.").
115 Star Athletica, L.L.C., 137 S.Ct. at 1005 (citing and quotingfrom Respondents Brief); see also
text and notes, supra notes 88-90.
116 Star Athletica, L.L.C., 137 S.Ct. at 1009 (noting that the definition includes two dimensional
works of art, and "thus provides that 'the design of a useful article' can include two dimensional
'pictorial' and 'graphic' features, and separability analysis applies to those features just as it does
to three-dimensional 'sculptural' features.").
I17 See COMPENDIUM supra note 53, at § 924.2(B).
118 Star Athletica, L.L.C., 137 S.Ct. at 1030 (Breyer J., dissenting).
119 Id. at 1033.
120 Id
121 Id.
122 Idatl033-34.
123 Id at 1035.
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other words, granting copyright to Varsity Brands' designs gave them
exclusive rights in the useful article-the uniform.
IV. THE IMPACT OF STAR ATHLETICA
This section first discusses the potential impact of the Star
Athletica test by speculating how several challenging cases from the
pre-Star Athletica era might be decided today. This summary is
intended to show that the new test, when applied generously, could
result in copyright protection in some cases where protection had been
denied in the past.
A. What if? The New Test as Applied to Clothing, Mannequins, Outdoor
Light Fixture and Bike Racks
1. Clothing and the Fashion Industry:
Historically, it has been difficult to copyright clothing designs1 24
so the Star Athletica decision is predicted to have major implications for
the fashion and apparel industry.1 25 It is said to be a step forward for
fashion designers,1 26 and it provides incentives for the fashion industry
to file more copyright registrations.1 2 7 Moreover, it should create
uniformity. 128 On the other hand, Justice Breyer raised concerns about
extending protection to garments in disregard of Congress's refusal to
afford such protection and he predicts that the decision will cause
unforeseeable disruption in the fashion industry. 129
It is appropriate to ask whether any of these predictions might be
correct and if the Court's relatively simple test will make much of a
difference. 130 The majority said that the language of the Copyright Act
supports conceptual separability,1 31 but it also made clear that the design
of clothing, such as the blank cheerleading uniform, cannot be protected
by copyright because those aspects of clothing are useful:
124 Star Athletica, L.L.C, 137 S.Ct. at 1033 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Statements by attorneys
Joshua Rudawitz & Patrick Concannon, supra note 20.
125 Statements by attorneys Kimberly Warshawsky and Lauren Emerson and Jed Wakefield,
supra note 4; but see statement by attorney Sherry Jetter, supra note 3 (stating the ruling has not
significantly changed the landscape).
126 Statement by attorney John DeMatteo, supra note 4; Statement by attorney John Mashni,
supra note 3 (the decision is a victory for the fashion design industry). But see statement by
attorney Sherry Jetter, supra note 3 (the result will likely have little impact on the fashion
industry).
127 Mohan, supra note 3, at 39.
128 Nee, Natland & Zelkind, supra note 2.
129 Star Athletica, L.L.C, 137 S.Ct.at 1034 (Breyer, J., dissenting)(noting higher prices and
unforeseeable disruption in the industry).
130 As summarized in, supra notesl23-128 the predictions are not uniform.
131 Star Athletica, L.L.C., 137 S.Ct. at 1014.
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Even if respondents [Varsity Brands] ultimately succeed in
establishing a valid copyright in the surface decorations at issue
here, respondents have no right to prohibit any person from
manufacturing a cheerleading uniform of identical shape, cut, and
dimensions to the ones on which the decorations in this case appear.
They may prohibit only the reproduction of the surface designs in
any tangible medium of expression- a uniform or otherwise. 132
Given this limiting statement, clothing designers have not really
gained much additional protection due to Star Athletica. Copyright
protection for textile and fabric designs as two dimensional pictorial and
graphic works was well established long before Star Athletica.133 The
fabric or textile designer's copyright on a floral print design is infringed
when that work is reproduced without the designer's permission as a
blouse or a skirt, as wallpaper or the fabric covering a sofa, or drapes
for the parlor. Just as Varsity Brands' two-dimensional surface designs
were reproduced without permission on Star Athletica's useful
articles-the cheerleading uniforms, the floral print designer's
copyright is infringed when his or her design is reproduced as fabric
that is used to cover a variety of useful articles. After all, the ultimate
separability question is whether the feature for which protection is
claimed would have been eligible for copyright as a pictorial, graphic,
or sculptural work had it originally been fixed in some medium other
than a useful article before being applied to a useful article.1 34
A variation on this is as follows: if you can imagine the textile
design as an expressive piece of textile art that you could hang on your
wall, then it is copyrightable.1 35 In short, Star Athletica does not alter
copyright protection for fabric and textile designs, 136 and the Court took
pains to say that it was not extending protection to the functional
aspects of fashion design such as the cut or venting of a garment.1 37 It
emphasized several times that Varsity Brands had no right to prohibit
132 Id. at 1006; id. at 1016 (noting that the Court repeated this point later in the opinion, stating
that "our test does not render the shape, cut, and physical dimensions of the cheerleading
uniforms eligible for copyright protection.").
133 See, e.g., Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1960)
(discussing infringement of textile design); L.A. Printex Indus., Inc. v. Aeropostale, Inc., 676
F.3d 841 (9th Cir. 2012) (discussing infringement of textile patterns); Unicolors, Inc. v. Urban
Outfitters,Inc., 2017 CCH Copyright Law Decision ¶ 31,078 (9th Cir. 2017) (stating that Urban
Outfitters infringed by developing a dress with a fabric design that was overwhelmingly similar to
Unicolors' design); Tufenkian Inport/Export Ventures Inc. v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc., 338 F.3d
127 (2d Cir. 2003) (discussing the infringement of textile designs made into carpets); see also 17
U.S.C. §§ 102(a)(5) & 101 (definition of pictorial, graphic and sculptural works).
134 Star Athletica, L.L.C, 137 S.Ct. at 1011; see also 17 U.S.C. § 113(a) (2012) (stating the right
to reproduce a pictorial or graphic work in copies includes the right to reproduce the work in or
on any article, useful or otherwise).
135 Rudawitz & Concannon, supra note 20.
136 See cases cited, supra note 133.
137 Rudawitz & Concannon, supra note 20.
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any person from making the useful article-the plain, unadorned
cheerleading uniform. 138 The imagined blouse or dress after the
conceptual extraction of the floral print or plaid textile design remains a
plain, unadorned blouse or dress. 139 Moreover, there are well recognized
but relatively plain, unadorned cheerleader outfits which function
effectively without stripes and chevrons; e.g., the uniforms worn by
Song Girls who cheer for the Trojans of the University of Southern
California.
There are some clothing and apparel cases which might come out
differently if litigated today after the Court's ringing endorsement of
conceptual separability in Star Athletica. For instance, a court might
now be more willing to protect the decorative elements on other
uniforms as conceptually separable 40 just as appliques shaped like
hearts, flowers and berries placed on seersucker children's rompers can
be perceived separately from those simple garments and imagined
separately as two-dimensional graphic works.1 41 Assuming sufficient
originality for copyright protection, such appliques would be infringed
by slavish copies applied on other garments as well as on a child's
seersucker romper.1 42 Still, "basic design elements of apparel-such as
neckline, sleeve style, skirt shape, hemline, or pocket style-are
inseparable from the utilitarian aspects of clothing and are
uncopyrightable no matter how original they may be."1 43 However, it
may still be difficult to perceive certain elements of a prom dress as
being conceptually separable from the garment. Can decorative sequins
and crystals on the bodice and the horizontal satin ruching at the waist
really be perceived as works of art separate from the gown?144
The amount of copyright litigation in the clothing and apparel
industry may increase after Star Athletical45 but it is doubtful that the
Court's new test for determining the conceptual separability of artistic
features incorporated on clothing is going to make much of a difference.
Notwithstanding the dissent's contention that Varsity Brands' stripes
and chevrons were not separable from the uniforms,1 46 the placement of
138 Star Athletica, L.L.C., 137 S.Ct. at 1006, 1013.
139 Cf id. at 1032.
140 Cf Galiano v. Harrah's Operating Co., 416 F.3d 411 (5th Cir. 2005) (noting that decorative
elements were inseparable from the uniform because they could not be marketed separately).
141 Cf Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers, 529 U.S. 205 (2000) (noting that Samara's
garments could not be protected as trade dress under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act without a
showing of secondary meaning).
142 Samara Bros., Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 165 F.3d 120, 132 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that
Samara's designs were sufficiently original to be protected by copyright, but that protection was
thin and would be infringed only by virtual identical copying).
143 JOYCE ETAL., supra note 10, at 188 n.4.
144 Cf Jovani Fashion, Ltd. v. Fiesta Fashions, 500 Fed. Appx. 42, 44-45 (2d Cir. 2012) (noting
that all of this does not invoke in the viewer a concept other than that of clothing).
145 Mohan, supra note 3, at 39.
146 Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct 1002, 1030 (2017) (Breyer, J.,
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most pictorial or graphic works on useful articles, like putting the image
of Mickey Mouse on a sweatshirt or a colorful floral decal on the back
of a kitchen chair, present relatively easy cases for doing a separability
analysis compared to determining the copyrightability of sculptural
features incorporated into a useful article like a lamp or a toaster.1 47
Disputes over the unauthorized reproduction of a textile or fabric design
to make clothing and drapes or cover furniture, and disputes or over the
unauthorized reproduction of copyrightable graphics and appliques on
clothing, are not really affected by the new test and should come out the
same way as before Star Athletica.
On the other hand, as illustrated by the disagreement between the
Star Athletica majority and Justices Breyer and Kennedy over the
separability of the plaintiffs' stripes, bars and chevrons, it seems likely
that there will be disagreements about separability in analogous
situations; where the plaintiffs design closely tracks the shape of the
garment. The new test certainly provides clarity by eliminating the
myriad of tests that courts and counsel had fought over for decades, but
there is a good argument that "the protection of designs applied to
apparel has neither been eroded nor enhanced; they are protected by
copyright to the extent they would have been protected had they been
fixed in a medium of expression other than a garment."l 48
2. Mannequins and Conceptually Separable Artistic Features:
Some lawyers predict that Star Athletica will have a substantial
impact outside of the fashion and clothing industries,1 49 and analyzing
how the new test might work in the Pivot Point and Carol Barnhart
cases helps understand whether this prediction is well founded. 50 The
useful articles in both cases were mannequins; the Seventh Circuit held
that Pivot Point's life size female mannequin head was copyrightable in
a 2-1 decision while the Second Circuit held that Barnhart's clothed and
nude life-size male and female mannequin torsos were not protectable
in a 2-1 decision. In my opinion, a court deciding Pivot Point today
would reach the same result under the new perceived and imagined
separately test. On the other hand, the application of this new test could
result in findings of separability, copyrightability, and infringement in
Barnhart.
The mannequin head in Pivot Point, named Mara, was designed to
dissenting).
147 See text and notes, supra 108-117. Justice Ginsburg's argument about separability supports
my contention that the hard pre-Star Athletica cases like Carol Barnhart, Brandir and Pivot Point
will be just as difficult to decide utilizing the new test.
148 Jetter, supra note 3.
149 See, e.g., authorities cited in notes, supra notes 3-4.
150 Pivot Point International, Inc. v. Charlene Products, Inc., 372 F.3d 913 (7th Cir. 2004); Carol
Barnhart, Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1985).
168 [Vol. 36:1
ALL FOR COPYRIGHT
imitate the 'hungry look' of a high-fashion runway model. It was
marketed as a premium item to cutting-edge hair-stylists and for use in
hair design competitions.1 5 The defendant's mannequin head, named
Charlene, was remarkably similar, including a double hairline seen in
the plaintiffs first version. The trial court granted summary judgment
for the defendant after concluding that plaintiff s mannequin "could not
be copyrighted, because 'even though one can conceive of Mara as a
sculpture displayed as art, it would not be equally useful if the features
that Pivot Point wants to copyright were removed."' 152 The Seventh
Circuit disagreed, saying that Mara's face was copyrightable:
It certainly is not difficult to conceptualize a human face,
independent of all of Mara's specific facial features, i.e., the shape of
the eye, the upturned nose, the angular cheek and jaw structure, that
would serve the utilitarian functions of a hair stand and, if proven, of
a makeup model. Indeed, one is not only able to conceive of a
different face than that portrayed on the Mara mannequin, but one
easily can conceive of another visage that portrays the 'hungry look'
on a high fashion runway model. 153
This statement can be rephrased to be consistent with the Star
Athletica test: the features of Mara's face including the shape of her
eyes, her upturned nose, her angular cheek and jaw line-those features
that give her the 'hungry look' of a runway model-can be perceived as
a three dimensional work of sculpture separate from an ovoid shaped
head used as a hair stand and for hair styling that qualifies as a
protectable sculptural work when it is imagined separately from that
useful article. 154 Writing for the court, I would add the next two
sentences for good measure:
Are we to deny copyright protection to a life-size bust by Rodin
simply because the sculptor decided to have reproductions mass-
produced for sale to haberdashers and other stores for the display of
hats and neckties? See 17 U.S.C. § 113(a). Moreover, the defendants
could have sculpted a mannequin head evoking the 'hungry look'
without making a slavish copy of Mara; the plaintiffs copyright,
though thin, is not anorexic.
The second sentence is added to counter points raised in the Pivot
Point dissent, emphasizing that copyright does not protect functional
151 Pivot Point International, Inc., 372 F.3d at 915.
152 Id. at 917 (citing and quoting from 170 F. Supp. 2d 828, 833 (N.D. Ill. 2001)).
153 Id. at 931 (adding that just as Mattel is entitled to copyright protection for the upturned nose,
bow lips and widely spaced eyes of its iconic Barbie doll, so was the plaintiff Pivot Point entitled
to copyright protection for its hungry look mannequin); id. at 929-30 (discussing and citing
Mattel, Inc. v. Goldberger doll Manufacturing Co., 365 F.3d 133, 136 (2d Cir. 2004)).
154 This is my paraphrase of the Star Athletica test.
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products and fearing that the majority had granted copyright protection
to the functional aspects of a useful article. 15 5 The defendant can make a
life size mannequin head that has the hungry look of a runway model
without making a slavish copy of the plaintiffs mannequin head.
Moreover, the Star Athletica majority says the statute does not require
the imagined remainder after the facial features are extracted-the
ovoid with the dimensions of a human head-to be an equally useful
mannequin head. 156
The mannequins in Carol Barnhart were four life-size human
torsos, made of styrene. The male and female figures did not have
necks, arms or backs, and were designed for displaying sweaters,
blouses, and dress shirts in clothing stores. Two torsos were
anatomically accurate nude male and female figures from roughly the
navel to the just above the shoulder blades. The other torsos were clad
in an open collar men's shirt and an open collar blouse. The plaintiffs
styrene mannequin torsos were slavish copies. 157 The Second Circuit
majority determined that the features claimed by the plaintiff to be
aesthetic or artistic were inextricably intertwined with the utilitarian
feature-the display of clothes-and thus not conceptually separable
and copyrightable. 158 The dissent wrote that separateness "exists
whenever the design creates in the mind of the ordinary observer two
different concepts that are not inevitably entertained simultaneously....
The test is not whether the observer fails to recognize the object as a
[display mannequin] but only whether the concept of the utilitarian
function can be displaced in the mind by some other concept. . . . The
separate concept will be that of a work of art." 159
I think Carol Barnhart might be decided differently after Star
Athletic. Here is the key part of my majority opinion:
The features of Carol Barnhart's torsos, including the shapes and
dimensions of their chests, breasts, stomachs and shoulders, both
nude and wearing a simple open collar shirt or blouse, can be
perceived as three-dimensional sculptural works separate from life
size male and female mannequin torsos used for clothing displays.
They qualify as protectable sculptural works when they imagined
separately from those useful articles. 160
155 Pivot Point International, Inc., 372 F.3d at 933-34.
156 Cf Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S.Ct. 1002, 1006 (2017).
157 Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 412-13 (2d Cir. 1985).
158 Id. at 419.
159 Id. at 422-23 (Newman J., dissenting).
160 This is my paraphrase of the Star Athletica test. See, e.g., Design Ideas, Ltd. v. Meijer, Inc.,
2017 BL 210798 (C.D. Ill. 2017) (post-Star Athletica decision finding copyright protection for
plastic clothespins adorned by bird silhouettes). But see Zahourek Systems, Inc. v. Balanced Baby
University LLC, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47165 (D. Colo. 2016) (noting that plaintiff's interactive
learning toy that required the user to shape muscles of clay and attach them to a body was a useful
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Here also, I would add the next three sentences for good measure:
Are we to deny copyright protection to a life size male statue by
Michelangelo simply because he decides to have relatively
inexpensive reproductions of David mass-produced for sale to high-
end department stores for the display of men's clothing? See 17
U.S.C. § 113(a). Indeed, the defendants could have sculpted
anatomically correct male and female mannequin torsos without
make slavish copies of Barnhart's torsos-or Michelangelo's David
for that matter; the plaintiff s copyright, though thin, is not anorexic.
The defendant is free to copy the original (nude and clothed male and
female torsos), but it cannot slavishly copy the copy (the plaintiffs
renditions of those torsos). 161
As noted earlier in connection with Pivot Point and the mannequin
heads, according to the majority in Star Athletica, the Copyright Act
does not require the imagined remainder-the torsos devoid of the
anatomical features or the simple blouse/shirt-to be equally as useful
as Barnhart's sculpted mannequin torsos.1 62
3. Outdoor Lights and Bike Racks - Still Unprotectable!
In Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer and Brandir International, Inc. v.
Cascade Pacific Lumber Co. the appellate courts denied copyright
protection for a modem outdoor lighting fixture and a bicycle rack
referred to as the ribbon rack. 163 I contend that these cases would come
out the same way under the Star Athletica test because neither work has
a feature which can be perceived as a two or three-dimensional works of
art separate from the useful article, and which qualifies as protectable
sculptural work if imagined separately from the useful article in which
it is incorporated. There are no features in or on either article which can
be extracted to standalone as a pictorial, graphic or sculptural work. The
shapes of both articles are inseparable from their utilitarian aspects.1 64
Moreover, notwithstanding the Court's statement in Star Athletica
that "the statute does not require the imagined remainder to be a fully
functioning useful article at all,"l 65 the opinion should not be pushed to
hold that the overall shapes of these very attractive but functional
articles are copyrightable sculptural works which happen to be used
article that was not infringed by defendant's display of these models in a magazine because no
features of plaintiff's works were conceptually separable).
161 See, e.g., Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 249 (1903).
162 Cf Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S.Ct. 1002, 1006 (2017).
163 Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 591 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1978). (reversing writ of mandamus issued by
the District Court ordering the Register of Copyrights to register the design of the light fixture);
Brandir International, Inc. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F. 2d 1142 (2d Cir. 1987) (affirming
lower court decision that the bicycle rack design was not entitled to copyright protection).
164 Cf StarAthletica, L.L.C., 137 S.Ct. at 1007.
165 Id. at 1014.
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primarily for lighting sidewalks and locking bicycles. There are no
imagined remainders. The useful articles and the sculptural artistic
works are the same-inextricably intertwined-because there are no
extractable features. Affording protection to the overall shape of these
aesthetically pleasing useful articles would protect industrial design
contrary to legislative intent when Congress passed the Copyright Act
of 1976.166 The Star Athletica majority made clear that there has to be a
feature which is able to exist on its own once it is imagined apart from
the useful article. If the feature cannot exist as a pictorial, graphic or
sculptural work when separated from the useful article, then it is one of
the article's utilitarian features and is unprotectable.1 67 If there is no
separable artistic feature, then you have a useful article which cannot be
protected by copyright.
The lighting fixtures in Esquire were stationary outdoor floodlights
of contemporary design with elliptically shaped housings which the
applicant sought to register as works of art.1 68 The Register of
Copyrights denied the applications, saying that the fixtures did not
contain "elements, either alone or in combination, which are capable of
independent existence as a copyrightable pictorial, graphic, or sculptural
work apart from the utilitarian aspect." 169 The District Court compelled
the Copyright Office to issue the registrations because it determined that
these fixtures were clearly works of art entitled to the same recognition
afforded to traditional sculpture, and it was not appropriate to deny
copyright protection to abstract modem art forms while affording
protection to traditional works of art.1 70
The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reversed after analyzing
the relevant passages from the House Report accompanying the recently
enacted Copyright Act of 1976. The court said those passages "indicate
unequivocally that the overall design or configuration of a utilitarian
object, even if it is determined by aesthetic as well as functional
considerations, is not eligible for copyright."l71 Unlike the lamp base
statuettes in Mazer, Esquire's light fixtures had no features that were
166 H. Rep. at 55; see also Star Athletica, L.L.C., 137 S.Ct. at 1030 (Breyer, J., dissenting);
Ginsburg, supra note 8, at 2.
167 Star Athletica, L.L.C., 137 S.Ct. at 1005 (adding that in order to qualify as a pictorial, graphic,
or sculptural work, the separable feature cannot itself be a useful article); id. (citing and quoting
section 101); id. at 1031 (stating that a copyrightable scale replica of a useful article like a car
model does not entitle that replica's creator to any rights in the useful article itself).
168 Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 591 F.2d at 798 (noting that the applications were filed pursuant to the
1909 Copyright Act which was still in effect. The works of art category was at 17 U.S.C. § 5(g)).
169 Id at 798-99 (quoting the Register's analysis from the Joint Appendix).
170 Id. at 799 discussing 414 F. Supp 939 (D.D.C. 1976). The court was invoking the principle of
aesthetic nondiscrimination which was announced by Justice Holmes in his influential Bleistein
opinion, and reflected as well in the House Report's explanation of copyright's originality
standard which connotes no standard of novelty or literary or aesthetic merit. Bleistein v.
Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. at 251; H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476 at 51-52.
171 Id at 804.
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separable from their overall shape. 172 The court also said that extending
the nondiscrimination principle to justify copyright protection for these
lights as abstract sculpture "would undermine other plainly legitimate
goals of copyright law-in this case the congressional directive that
copyright protection should not be afforded to industrial designs." 173
The ribbon bicycle rack at issue in Brandir presents the same
problem as the light fixture in Esquire: it is an attractive 'sculptural'
work that functions effectively as a bike rack yet it has no conceptually
separable artistic features. 174 The Court of Appeals noted that
while the rack may have been derived in part from one or more
'works of art,' it is in its final form essentially a product of industrial
design. In creating the RIBBON Rack, the designer has clearly
adapted the original aesthetic elements to accommodate a further
utilitarian purpose. These altered design features of the RIBBON
Rack, including the space saving, open design achieved by widening
the upper loops to permit parking under as well as over the rack's
curves, the straightened vertical elements, that all in- and above-
ground installation of the rack, the ability to fit all types of bicycles
and mopeds, and the heavy-gauged tubular construction of rustproof
galvanized steel, are all features that combine to make for a safe,
secure and maintenance free system of parking bicycles and
mopeds. 175
Here again, unless this bike rack can be regarded in its entirety as a
sculptural work that happens to function effectively as a safe, secure
and maintenance free system for parking bikes, it is exceedingly
difficult to perceive it as having a separable artistic feature that qualifies
as a sculptural work if it is imagined separately from the bike rack; it
has no features which can be perceived or imagined separately. Star
Athletica makes clear that copyrightability does not depend on how or
why this bike rack was designed, nor does it depend on marketability;
why a segment of the market is more interested in this design than other
bike rack designs. 176 The ribbon rack lacks any feature that can be
perceived as a separable work of art that qualifies on its own as a
172 Id. at 805.
173 Id. Hindsight is always 20/20 and it is relevant to note that at oral argument Esquire argued
unsuccessfully that it was seeking registration only for the housing of each fixture and not the
design of the entire assembly. Id at 806. Fast forward to the present-could this kind of
conceptual separability argument have been successful today? Could the cowl of these lights-the
elliptical housing-be perceived as a three dimensional work of art which would qualify as a
copyrightable sculptural work if imagined separately from the overall fixture? In my opinion,
reaching that conclusion also would be equivalent to affording copyright protection to industrial
design.
174 Brandir Intern., Inc. v. Cascade Pacific Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1148-49 (1987).
175 Id. at 1147.
176 Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S.Ct. 1002, 1015 (2017).
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protectable sculptural work.1 77
This article's re-litigation of the Esquire and Brandir cases-
applying the new Star Athletica test yet arriving at the same results as
before; denying copyright protection-shows that the new test is not a
panacea when the useful article at issue is closer to an unembellished
work of industrial design than a piece of sculpture. The hard cases from
the pre-Star Athletica era will be difficult cases today. The courts, in
deciding such challenging and close cases, should pay heed to the
following statement from Justice Breyer's dissent:
Indeed, great industrial design may well include design that is
inseparable from the useful article-where, as Frank Lloyd Wright,
put it, 'form and function are one. . . . Where they are one, the
designer may be able to obtain 15 years of protection though a design
patent.... But, if they are one, Congress did not intend a century or
more of copyright protection. 178
In other words, copyright should be denied because otherwise the
court would be extending protection impermissibly to industrial design.
The new perceived and imagined separately test does not alter the fact
that the Copyright Act and its legislative history still favors protection
for separable design features while disfavoring protection for the overall
shape of useful articles. 179 Although the originality standard for
pictorial, graphic and sculptural works does not imply any criterion of
artistic taste, aesthetic value or intrinsic quality,180 copyright is not the
appropriate basis for protecting the overall shape of products like
toasters, food processors and automobiles. Until Congress enacts a
general industrial design protection statute, absent a design patent or
trade dress protection, the shapes and designs of most useful products
are in the public domain. 81 Notwithstanding the aesthetic
nondiscrimination principle, competitors are free to copy the elegant
designs at issue in Esquire v. Ringer and Brandir because copying is
permitted unless the article is protected by copyright or a patent. 182 The
overriding policy is that our nation's intellectual property laws allow
and encourage imitation in the interest of promoting competition.18 3
B. There will be an increase in the number ofproduct shape copyright
infringement claims after Star Athletica
Writing for the majority Justice Thomas had no difficulty
177 Id. at 1008.
1781d. at 1034 (Breyer, J. dissenting).
179 Cf Ginsburg, supra note 8, at 57.
18o H. Rep. at 54.
181 Id at 58.
182 Brown, supra note 5, at 1341.
183 Id.
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determining that Varsity Brands' surface design features (the chevrons,
stripes, angles and lines) were conceptually separable from the
cheerleader uniform's shape and style. 184 This accommodating approach
to conceptual separability, coupled with copyright law's low originality
threshold 85 and several other factors, could result in manufacturers
becoming more aggressive in claiming copyright protection for artistic
features in or on their useful articles. The other factors include my
contention that some pre-Star Athletica decisions denying copyright
protection might come out differently today as well as possible changes
in Copyright Office internal practices regarding applied art that have
been published in response to this decision.1 86 One comment on a draft
of these changes states that "the Copyright Office is expanding its
consideration of useful articles and increasing registration. Indeed, . . .
[the changes] indicate consideration of the nuanced change, and
potential expansion of copyrightability for design elements of useful
articles."187 Hence, it is reasonable to predict that the Star Athletica
decision may result in more copyright registrations for artistic features
incorporated in and on product designs, 188 and embolden some
companies to be more aggressive going after knock-offs for copyright
infringement. The cost and difficulty for the alleged infringer to argue
against both the conceptual separability of artistic features incorporated
in or on the plaintiffs useful article and the originality
(copyrightability) of those separable design features may result in some
quick settlements for plaintiffs.1 89
However, notwithstanding the potential for more copyright
infringement actions, it will remain difficult for courts to determine
whether artistic features incorporated in a useful article are conceptually
separable even under the Supreme Court's new perceived and imagined
separately test. The test works well for design features which are 'on' a
useful article, but it is still hard to determine whether a sculptural
feature incorporated 'in' applied art is conceptually separable. 190
Moreover, courts need to be careful in making the separability
184 Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S.Ct. 1002, 1008 (2017) (reaching this
conclusion even though the designs had a striking outline and resemblance to the underlying
cheerleading uniforms; Rapcke, supra note 4.
185 "[T]he originality requirement is not particularly stringent . . . Originality requires only that
the author make the selection or arrangement independently . . . and that it display a minimal
level of creativity." Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340,
358 (1991).
186 See Venable analysis of changes in the Compendium, supra note 4.
187 Id.
188 Mashni, supra note 3; Mahon, supra note 3.
189 Wakefield, supra note 4 (noting that the decision "injects uncertainty into the apparel
industry, and will allow large apparel companies to leverage that uncertainty against low cost
alternative providers, who often lack the resources to fight these cases.").
190 Cf Ginsburg, supra note 8, at 54, 57.
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determination due the risk of extending protection to a product's
utilitarian features. As discussed below, this risk is genuine.
C. The risk that copyright protection will be extended to utilitarian
features
The threshold for determining the copyrightability of a graphic
work is low, 191 and the Court has said that almost any design is
protectable if placed first on paper or canvas. 192 Justice Thomas said
applying the new perceived and imagined separately test was
straightforward in Star Athletica. One can identify surface decorations
on the uniforms as:
features having pictorial, graphic, or sculptural qualities . . . [and] if
the arrangement of colors, shapes, stripes and chevrons . .. were
separated from the uniform and applied in another medium-for
example on a painter's canvas-they would qualify as 'two-
dimensional ... works of... art,' §101. And imaginatively
removing the surface decorations from the uniform and applying
them in another medium would notreplicate the uniform itself.1 93
However, the risk in any case like Star Athletica, as explained in
Justice Breyer's dissent, is that extending copyright to those artistic
features extends protection to the useful article itself when those
features are not truly conceptually separable.1 94 After all, "virtually any
industrial design can be thought of separately as a 'work of art ....
It is striking that the majority opinion acknowledged this possibility and
did not seem concerned. "Were we to accept petitioner's argument that
the only protectable features are those that play absolutely no role in an
article's function, we would effectively abrogate the rule of Mazer and
read 'applied art' out of the statute."1 96 Moreover, "separability does not
require the underlying useful article to remain .... ."197 and the majority
rejected "the view that a useful article must remain after the artistic
feature has been imaginatively separated from the article . . . ."198 These
statements are remarkable because Justice Thomas started his Star
Athletica opinion by stating that Congress had not provided protection
for industrial design, and acknowledged that the line between art and
191 See, e.g., Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirts, Inc. 323 F.3d 763 (9th Cir. 2003); Atari Games Corp. v.
Oman, 888 F.2d 878 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
192 Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S.Ct. 1002, 1012 (2017); Cf L.A. Printex
Indus. Inc. v. Aeropostale, Inc., 676 F.3d 841 (9th Cir. 2012); Home Legend, LLC v. Mannington
Mills, Inc. 784 F.3d 1404 (11"P Cir. 2015); Mann, supra note 3.
193 Star Athletica, L.L.C., 137 S.Ct. at 1012.
194 Id. at 1033 (Breyer, J. dissenting).
195 Id.
196 Id. at 1014.
197 Id.
198 Id.
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design is hard to draw, especially when the industrial design
incorporates artistic elements.1 99
The last section of the Court's opinion responds to the defendant's
contention that allowing the plaintiffs' surface decorations (the
chevrons, stripes lines, curves and diagonals) to qualify as a work of
authorship was inconsistent with Congress' intent to exclude industrial
design from copyright protection as evidenced by its refusal to provide
such protection in the Copyright Act of 1976 and by its later enactment
of two statutes protecting the designs of boat hulls and semiconductor
chips while again declining to enact a general design protection
statute. 200 According to the petitioners, this showed that Congress wants
industrial design protection claims under the design patent statute. 20 1
The majority's response was to say that inaction by Congress ordinarily
lacks persuasive significance, that design patent and copyright are not
mutually exclusive, and that a presumption against copyright protection
for certain features of industrial design undermines Congress' choice in
enacting section 102(a)(5) and the accompanying definition of pictorial
graphic and sculptural works in section 101.202 Moreover, the Court
emphasized that its new test does not make the shape, cut and
dimensions of the cheerleader uniform copyrightable.203
The majority's dismissal of the petitioner's industrial design
argument was cavalier in view of Congress' history of rejecting general
industrial design protection billS 204 and the Supreme Court's repeated
statements in decisions involving efforts to protect product design under
state law that everyone is free to copy that which copyright and patent
law leave in the public domain.205 The opinion is silent on competition
policy. 206 Moreover, in responding to Star Athletica's argument that the
cheerleader uniforms, devoid of chevrons and stripes as plain white
outfits, were not useful, the Court said that this argument was misguided
because it was based on the assumption that copyright protection is
limited to features that are solely artistic. 207 This is not the case
according to the majority because "[t]he focus of the separability
inquiry is on the extracted features and not on any aspects of the useful
article remains after the extraction." 208 The majority seems to be saying
that the extension of copyright protection to applied art contemplates
199 Star Athletica, L.L.C, 137 S.Ct. at 1008.
200 Id. at 1015 (citing 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-14 (the semiconductor chip statute was enacted in 1984)
and §§ 1301-1332 (the vessel hull design statute was passed in 1998)).
201 Star Athletica, L.L.C., 137 S.Ct. at 1015.
202 Id
203 Id.
204 Id. at 1034 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also text and notes, supra notes 18-24.
205 See text and notes, supra notes 27-34.
206 Mann, supra note 3.
207 Star Athletica, L.L.C., 137 S.Ct. at 1013.
208 Id. at 1013.
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copyright protection for expression that is utilitarian to some degree. 209
The majority made clear that copyright extends to pictorial,
graphic and sculptural works whether as free-standing works of art or as
features of useful articles. It emphasized that Varsity Brands' designs,
assuming originality, were copyrightable as fixed in some tangible
medium other than the cheerleader outfit, such as on a painter's canvas,
and did not lose that status when applied to the useful article-the
outfit. This works with cheerleader uniforms, but not so smoothly with
other useful articles like a belt buckles, bike racks, furniture and
mannequins. Should not the ultimate question be simply whether the
useful article at issue is still useful without the artistic features? 210
Otherwise, copyright protection might be extended to an article's
utilitarian features. However, the Star Athletica majority emphasized
that the separability analysis is on the extracted features, and not on the
useful article that remains after that conceptual (imaginary)
extraction.211 Accordingly, there is a significant risk that some courts,
when applying the new two-part test, will afford copyright protection to
utilitarian features of useful articles that should be left in the public
domain.
Consumers will suffer as a consequence of this expansive view of
separability and hence copyrightability. Here is a mundane example
involving car parts. A couple years ago I smashed the bumper and back
left fender on my father-in-law's 1999 Ford Escort when I backed out of
my garage, forgetting that this little Ford was parked the driveway. The
cost of replacing this bumper was under my deductible but what if Ford
could claim copyright protection for these car parts as separable
sculptural features? As it was, my repair shop could get relatively
inexpensive replacement parts which were exact copies of the more
expensive, genuine but not copyrightable Ford replacement parts. I
doubt there are any extractable copyrightable features on that bumper
and fender but I think this hypothetical makes my point about the risk of
not asking whether the article can function without the extracted
features. 212 It should come as no surprise that the automobile industry
has pushed for a general design protection statute while insurers fight
back, arguing that protection will drive up the cost of spare parts.213
209 Mann, supra note 3. See, e.g., Jetmax Ltd v. Big Lots, Inc., 2017 Copyright Law Decisions ¶
31,143 at 49,958-59 n.2 (S.D.N.Y 2017)(decorative tear shaped covers in an ornamental light set
held to be sculptural works capable of existing apart from the utilitarian aspect of the light set
even though the covers reduced glare and have some useful function); McClay, supra note 4
(discussing the Jetmax decision).
210 Mann, supra note 3.
211 Star Athletica, L.L.C., 137 S.Ct. at 1013; Mann, supra note 3.
212 See, e.g., Shipley, supra note 22, at 392-94; Pivot Point International, Inc. v. Charlene
Products, 372 F.3d 913, 932; Hart v. Dan Chase Taxidermy Supply, 86 F.3d 320 (2d Cir. 1996).
213 JOYCE ET. AL, supra note 10, at 199.
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It is important for alleged infringers to remember that the two
dissenting Justices, while agreeing with much of the Court's analysis,
did not believe that Varsity Brands' designs were in fact separable from
the uniforms. "A picture of the relevant design features, whether
separately 'perceived' on paper or in the imagination, is a picture of,
and thereby 'replicate[s],' the underlying useful article of which they
are a part . . . . Hence, the design features that Varsity seeks to protect
are not 'capable of existing independently o[f] the utilitarian aspects of
the article."' 214 If alleged infringers have the resources to fight back,
they need to argue that the alleged artistic features are not standalone
pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works. They need to assert that those
features replicate the underlying useful article of which they are a part
and that protecting those features by copyright wrongfully extends
protection to functional and utilitarian features. 215 In essence, they need
to show, as in the ribbon rack litigation, that the useful article at issue
has no separable features whatsoever and can be freely copied. It is all
going to come back to how the lower courts and counsel interpret and
apply the Court's simple new test.
CONCLUSION
This article's discussion of the evolution of copyright protection
for product shape and design and the Star Athletica decision as well as
its survey of how several pre-Star Athletica cases might be decided
today leads to the following conclusions and contentions. Although the
Supreme Court's new two part test brings uniformity and should be
relatively easy to apply in connection with pictorial and graphic works
applied on useful articles, the application of the new test to sculptural
features incorporated into useful articles will remain challenging for
counsel and courts. Infringement claims over useful articles that are
similar to those at issue in the tough cases from the pre-Star Athletica
era will remain difficult. Even though the overall shape of a useful
article like a chair, toaster, food processor, car or bike rack can be
expressed by an industrial designer in several different ways, there
should be no copyright protection for any of these articles unless they
have a separable feature. The nation's legislative policy against
protection for industrial design needs to be respected. This bars
214 Star Athletica, L.L.C, 137 S.Ct. at 1030-31 (Breyer, J. dissenting) (citing 17 U.S.C. § 101
(2012)).
215 See, e.g., Design Ideas, Ltd. v. Meijer, Inc., 2017 BL 210798 (C.D. Ill. 2017) (noting that
plastic clothespins adorned with bird silhouettes were protectable sculptural works post-Star
Athletica); Hoberman Designs, Inc. v. Gloworks Imports, Inc., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 176117
(C.D. Cal 2015) (expanding and contracting geometric toys were at issue with court recognizing
that the combination of unoriginal geometric shapes can be protected by copyright but that the
scope of protection for the plaintiffs toys was limited by their mechanical and utilitarian aspects
that allowed for expansion and contraction so summary judgment was granted for the defendant).
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copyright when an article's aesthetic elements are inextricably
interwoven with its utilitarian aspects. The risk of applying the Supreme
Court's new test too generously is the grant of copyright protection to
an article's overall shape and thereby extending the copyright monopoly
to a useful article's functional or utilitarian features. Granting copyright
protection in this way could result in outcomes which would be contrary
to Congress's steadfast refusal since 1914 to enact a general industrial
design protection statute as well the Supreme Court's statements about
the importance of the competitive mandate and the public's right to
copy that which our copyright and patent laws leave in the public
domain.
